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LEGISLATION

FLORIDA'S OBSCENITY STATUTES - SOME
RECOMMENDATIONS
Prior to 1957, the power of a state to regulate what it considered
to be obscene expression was virtually unquestioned. In that year,
however, the United States Supreme Court decided Butler v. Michigan,' which was followed by a flurry of Supreme Court decisions on
obscenity. In an effort to keep Florida's law in line with the developing procedures and standards established by Butler and subsequent decisions, the Florida Legislature has amended Florida's obscenity control statutes at three of the past five sessions. But these
statutes still do not meet the due process requirements fixed by the
Court. The purpose of this note is not to consider the delicate and
controversial issues involved in the clash between first amendment
rights and the state's right to control obscenity. Instead, the sole
purpose is to analyze Florida's obscenity statutes in light of present
constitutional requirements as a basis upon which to recommend
needed legislative reform.
Florida's statutory law regarding obscenity control is found in two
chapters of the Florida Statutes; chapter 521, entitled "Exhibition of
Motion Pictures" and chapter 847, entitled "Obscene Literature; Profanity." Because these chapters are distinct in operation and effect,
they will be discussed separately.
MovIE CENSORSHIP

Chapter 521 directs the governor to appoint three Florida citizens
to the National Board of Review of Motion Pictures, Inc., a nationwide movie censorship board. The act makes it unlawful 2 to exhibit
any commercial film that has not been reviewed and approved by
this board, the New York State Department of Education, or the Film
Estimate Board of National Organizations, another movie censorship
board. In any prosecution for violation of the statute the only
question to be decided by the court or jury is whether the film was
approved or disapproved by the censors. Moreover, the burden of
proof is on the defendant to establish this approval.3 Whether the
film is obscene in fact is not an issue.
The statute also provides an injunctive procedure which permits the circuit court to issue a temporary restraining order against
1. 352 U.S. 380 (1957).
2. The penalty for violation of the act is imprisonment in the county jail
not exceeding six months or a fine not exceeding $500, or both; a second violation
is a felony punishable by imprisonment in the state prison for up to three years or
a fine not exceeding $5,000, or both. FLA. STAT. §521.04 (1963).
3. FLA. STAT. § §521.02 (1), .021 (6) (1963).
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the exhibition of any unlicensed film once a complaint is filed by
the prosecuting officer. The exhibitor is entitled to an immediate trial,
but here, as in a trial for violation of the act, the single issue is
whether the film has the censor's stamp of approval. If the defendant is unable to carry the burden of establishing this approval,
the film will be permanently enjoined.4
This injunctive jurisdiction was added by a 1961 amendment,5
apparently in reliance upon Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago.6
In Times Film the United States Supreme Court considered a Chicago ordinance which required all films to be submitted to the police
commissioner for censoring prior to their exhibition. The ordinance
made it unlawful to exhibit any film not licensed by the commissioner.
An appeal to the mayor was provided, but his decision was final. The
Court held this procedure was not void on its face, thus recognizing
that freedom of speech does not include the right to exhibit any
motion picture at least once. Although the only clear holding of
Times Film was that censorship of movies prior to their first public
exhibition is not unconstitutional per se, some interpreted the decision as an approval of censorship statutes that were substantially
similar to the Chicago ordinance.
In March of 1965, however, the Court made it clear in Freedman
v. State of Maryland7 that ordinances such as the one involved in
Times Film can no longer survive.8 In Freedman, the Court was
called upon to review a Maryland statute which required all motion
pictures to be reviewed and approved by the Maryland State Board
of Censors prior to their exhibition, with a right of appeal to the
Maryland courts. Freedman refused to submit the film "Revenge at
Daybreak" to the board of censors and subsequently challenged the
constitutionality of the statute as applied on the ground that it provided neither judicial participation in the procedure which bans a
film, nor any assurance of prompt judicial review. The Maryland
Court of Appeals upheld the statute, relying on Times Film. The
United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that a movie censorship system can avoid constitutional infirmity only if: (1) the state
is required to immediately initiate a judicial proceeding to determine
if the film in question is legally obscene, (2) the state has the burden
of proving this obscenity, and (3) the procedure in no way lends an
effect of finality to the censor's judgment. 9 Thus Times Film was al4.
5.
6.
7.

FLA. STAT. §521.021 (1963).

Fla. Laws 1961, ch. 61-4.
365 U.S. 43 (1961).
85 Sup. Ct. 734 (1965).

8. This may be partially due to the fact that all four of the Times Film dissenters are still on the Court while two from the majority have retired.
9.

85 Sup. Ct. 734, 739 (1965).
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lowed to stand, but only for the narrow proposition that prior restraints are not "necessarily unconstitutional under all circumstances."l0
The Court reasoned that although prior censorship was permissible
under the procedural safeguards stated above, these safeguards were
not present in the Maryland statute. The Court stated that an exhibitor's stake in any one film would often be insufficient to warrant
a protracted and onerous course of litigation; and that a distributor
might be equally unwilling to initiate a burdensome lawsuit in one
area when the film could be freely shown in most other areas of the
country.:" Because of this, the Court believed that the practical effect
of the statute in many cases was to make final the censor's original
determination. This, the Court decided, could be cured only by
requiring the censor either to promptly approve a film or to initiate
court action to restrain its exhibition.
Under the requirements set out in Freedman, it is clear that
Florida's movie censorship law is unconstitutional. Chapter 521 does
not merely lend an air of finality to the censor's finding; it makes this
finding controlling on the court. The only issue at trial is whether
the film has been approved, and the burden is on the defendant to
establish this approval. This dearly violates the basic requirement of
Freedman that there be an adversary proceeding on the merits of
obscenity, with the burden of proof on the state. Therefore, if
Florida is to have an enforceable movie censorship law, the legislature must substantially amend chapter 521 to bring it within the
guidelines established by Freedman.
With the following changes, chapter 521 should pass the present
constitutional tests as established by the Court, and still provide
Florida with an effective movie censorship statute. First, the conclusive presumption that any unlicensed film is obscene should be
eliminated. In its stead should be placed the requirement that a
film can be declared obscene only at a judicial proceeding initiated by
the state. Thus the question whether a film had been approved as
now required by chapter 521 would be relevant, but not controlling.
It would simply be evidence going to the issue of whether the film is
obscene in light of contemporary community standards. This requirement would be applicable to both a prosecution for exhibition of an
obscene film and a suit seeking a permanent injunction against an
obscene film. Second, as a guide for determining obscenity, the
statute should include the standard set forth by the Supreme Court
in Roth v. United States: 2 "Whether to the average person, applying
10. Id. at 736. (Emphasis by the Court.)
11. Id. at 789.

12. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
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contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the
material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interests."13 The violation, therefore, would no longer be the exhibition of an unlicensed
film; rather it would be the exhibition of a film judicially determined
to be obscene according to the Roth standard. Third, the burden of
proving that the film in question is obscene should be dearly placed
on the state. The prosecutor would be responsible for proving each
element of the Roth test, as well as meeting all other requirements established by the Supreme Court.
It should be recognized that convictions would be more difficult
to obtain under the amended statute. Although the Court still accepts the Roth test, this obscenity standard has been restricted considerably by subsequent decisions. First, "average person" has been
interpreted to mean average adult person, so that a film cannot be
judged according to its effect on children or other highly susceptible
persons. 14 Second, "dominant theme of the material taken as a
whole" requires that a film be judged according to its over-all effect,
not by isolated parts. 15 Thus the fact that a film contains one or two
offensive scenes will not be sufficient to adjudge the film obscene.
Third, whatever "prurient interest" might mean, it is something more
than just material which stimulates lustful and lascivious thoughts.
Instead the material in question must be "patently offensive,"' 16 which
apparently means that only "hard-core" pornography will be held
17
obscene by the Court.
As to the meaning of "contemporary community standards," even
the Supreme Court has been unable to agree. In Jacobellis v. Ohio,18
the Court held a French film entitled "The Lovers" not to be obscene,
but no more than two justices could agree on a basis for the "community standard." Two justices believed the relevant community
should be the entire nation. 19 Two others advocated the use of local
community standards with review by the Supreme Court only on
the question whether the lower court's finding was supported by
13. Id. at 489.

14. Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 880 (1957).
15. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957).
16. Manual Enterprises v. Day, 370 U.S. 478, 486 (1962) in which the Court
reviewed a magazine entitled Manual, a publication for homosexuals. The maga-

zine consisted primarily of photographs of nude male models posed together
suggestively so as to emphasize their genitals and buttocks. Names and addresses
of the models were available upon request, as well as additional photographs. The

Court held the magazine was not obscene under the amended standard.
17. See Lockhard & McClure, Censorship of Obscenity: The Developing Constitutional Standards, 45 MINN. L. REv. 5, 58-68 (1960).

18. 378 U.S. 184 (1964).
19. Id. at 195.
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sufficient evidence.20 As a practical matter, of course, the standard
applied will be that of the local area, because the jury will be chosen
from that area. This may well make a difference in Florida, where
there are notable differences among the various areas of the state.
Regardless of the standard applied, however, it is likely that
judges and juries in Florida will find films to be obscene which would
not be considered obscene by the Supreme Court. Terms such as
"purient interest" and "community standards" are simply not susceptible to specific legal definition; and judging by the preponderance
of cases reversing lower state and federal findings of obscenity, it appears that the Roth standard means something entirely different to
the Supreme Court than to most other courts. 21 In Grove Press, Inc.
v. State22 and Tralins v. Gerstein,23 the Court reversed two Florida
decisions which had determined that certain materials, including the
Tropic of Cancer, were obscene according to the Roth standard as
applied to literature. There is every reason to believe that this same
gap in standards will exist if the Roth test is applied to motion pictures. But the application of the Roth standard to movies is still the
only feasible guide to incorporate into chapter 521, because it is the
only test that has the Supreme Court's approval.
Chapter 521 should also be amended to provide a procedure by
which a final judicial determination of obscenity can be obtained prior
to the date of the first exhibition of the film in question. This could
be done by requiring exhibitors to submit to the state attorney a
schedule of all films at least one month in advance of their exhibition
date. This requirement would not be burdensome on the exhibitors,
because all films are generally scheduled more than a month in advance.24- It would, however, provide a procedure under *hich the
prosecutor could go to court for a permanent injunction prior to the
exhibition of any film he believed to be obscene. Under this amendment, the question whether a film had been approved as now required
would serve a practical, but not a legal, purpose. It would serve as
a guide to prosecutors in reviewing lists of scheduled films, since a
prosecutor might want to investigate for possible injunctive action
only those films which were disapproved. Likewise, it would serve as
a guide to many theater owners, since they might consider exhibiting
only those films which had been approved. Because of this practical
advantage, the present system of appointing three Florida citizens to
the National Board of Review of Motion Pictures should be main20. Id. at 202.
21. See, e.g., One, Inc. v. Olesen, 355 U.S. 371 (1958); Times Film Corp. v.
City of
22.
23.
24.

Chicago, 355 U.S. 35 (1958).
378 U.S. 577 (1964), reversing156 So. 2d 537 (3d D.CA. Fla. 1963).
378 U.S. 576 (1964), reversing 151 So. 2d 19 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1963).
See Freedman v. State of Maryland, 85 Sup. Ct. 734, 740 (1965).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1965

5

Law Review,
18, Iss. 1 [1965],
8
OF FLORIDA
LAW Vol.
REVIEW
UNIVERSITYFlorida
[Vol. Art.
XVIII
tained. But under no circumstances should this censorship board's
approval or disapproval be permitted to have a binding effect on the
courts.
Chapter 521 now provides that any person sought to be enjoined
from exhibiting an allegedly obscene film shall be entitled to trial
within one day after joinder of issue and to a decision within two
days of the conclusion of the trial.2 5 This provision was added by
the 1961 session of the legislature26 in reliance upon Kingsley Books,
Inc. v. Brown, 27 which upheld a New York injunctive statute containing identical time limits. In Freedman, the Court restated its
approval of the New York procedure; 2 therefore, the Florida adaptation of the New York statute should be maintained. Under the
amended procedure, there could be a final judicial determination of
whether a film was obscene prior to the date it was originally
scheduled for exhibition, which dearly satisfies the requirements set
29

forth in Freedman.

It would be unrealistic, however, to expect all prosecutors to move
against objectionable films prior to their actual exhibition. Many,
if not most, prosecutors will take no action against a film until the
electorate protest following the first public exhibition. It is necessary,
therefore, that a provision for temporary restraining orders be provided and that the power to issue such orders be given to the circuit
judge according to the procedure now provided by section 521.021 (1)(2). This would provide a means whereby the exhibition of an
allegedly obscene film could be temporarily stopped until there
could be a judicial determination of obscenity. Here it is vital that
the exhibitor be assured a trial on the merits within one day after
joinder of issue and a decision within two days after the trial is concluded. As the Court stated in Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan,30
"any system of prior restraints of expression comes to this Court
bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity."31
It is unlikely, therefore, that the Court will accept any longer delay
for an adversary proceeding than that upheld in Kingsley Books.
Thus the amended statute would provide a system in which: (1)
the censor has the burden of instituting all judicial proceedings; (2)
any restraint prior to judicial review is imposed only briefly in order
to preserve the status quo; and (3)a prompt judicial determination
of obscenity is assured. With these procedural safeguards, Florida's
25.

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

§521.021 (3) (1963).
Fla. Laws 1961, ch. 61-4.
354 U.S. 436 (1957).
Freedman v. State of Maryland, 85 Sup. Ct. 734, 740 (1965).
Ibid.
372 U.S. 58 (1963).
Id. at 70.
FLA. STAT.
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movie censorship statute would meet all current constitutional require32
ments.
OBSCENE LITERATuRE

Chapter 847 of the Florida Statutes prohibits the sale or distribution of obscene materials. In an effort to conform this chapter to the
New York obscenity statute, which had previously been upheld by
the United States Supreme Court,33 the 1961 session of the legislature
substantially amended chapter 847. 3- This amendment added procedural time limits identical with those found in the New York
statutes35 and incorporated the Roth standard into the chapter as a
guide in determining whether material is obscene. 36
Unfortunately, however, chapter 847 as amended does not conform
to the New York statute in respect to the confiscation of obscene materials. The New York statute allows an injunction pendente lite
against the owner of allegedly obscene material to prevent distribution of the specific materials described in the injunction until the
outcome of the trial. Although it is not required by statute, the New
York practice is for the prosecuting attorney to attach copies of the
specific material to the complaint requesting the injunction. If the
judge is satisfied that the material is in fact obscene, the owner can be
temporarily enjoined, but only from distributing those materials
specified in the injunction. No confiscation is allowed under any
circumstances until the materials have been declared obscene at an
adversary judicial proceeding.
In contrast, however, chapter 847 allows any authorized law enforcement officer to seize "any of the materials, matters, articles, or
37
things possessed or otherwise dealt with in violation" of the statute
prior to an adversary judicial proceeding. Under this provision, a
law enforcement officer is authorized to confiscate all materials that,
in his opinion, are obscene. This confiscation is normally made pursuant to either section 847.03, allowing confiscation incident to arrest,
or section 933.02 (2) (c), authorizing search warrants for obscene literature. Moreover, there is no requirement that the search warrant
specify the material to be seized, other than that it be "obscene" or
"inviolation of" chapter 847.
Furthermore, section 933.14 prpvides that obscene materials and
other "contraband" such as narcotics and gambling paraphernalia are

32. See Freedman v. State of Maryland, 85 Sup. Ct. 734, 740 (1965)
Douglas, JJ. concurring).
33. Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436 (1957).
34. Fla. Laws 1961, ch. 61-7.

(Black,

35. FrA. STAT. §847.011 (7) (c) (1963).
36. FLA. STAT. §847.011 (10) (1963).
37. FLA. STAT. §847.011 (6) (1963).
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exceptions to the general statutory provision which permits a judge
or magistrate to order the return of property secured by an "unreasonable" search. The section declares that there shall be "no property
right" in obscene material and that the property shall be destroyed
if it is found to be obscene by the court. If the materials are not
found obscene, they can be returned by order of the court. This order,
however, can be issued only after a proceeding initiated by the claimant at which he has the burden of proving the materials were used in
38
a "lawful manner."
Two recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court conclusively demonstrate that Florida's statutes relating to the confiscation of obscene materials cannot withstand a constitutional attack.
In Marcus v. Search Warrant of Property, 9 the Court reviewed a
Missouri statute which provided for a search warrant to be issued on
a verified complaint that obscene material was being kept at a particular place. There was no requirement that the warrant specifically identify the materials for which the search was to be made.
This procedure, therefore, was similar to Florida's in that the officers
were permitted to make on-the-spot decisions whether the material
found was obscene. The Court held this statute unconstitutional,
reasoning that the officers were given too much discretion in choosing
which materials were obscene.
In Quantity of Books v. Kansas, 40 the Court assured the demise of
Florida's procedure. In that case, the Kansas Attorney General filed
an information identifying by title and description fifty-nine paperback books to be seized. Attached to the information were seven
samples of the books, all of which were substantially identical and
published by the same publisher. The district judge conducted a fortyfive minute ex parte inquiry during which he "scrutinized" the seven
books. He found there was probable cause for believing the materials
were obscene, and issued a warrant authorizing the seizure of only the
fifty-nine books identified by title. The Court held this procedure
unconstitutional even though a trial on obscenity was required within
ten days after joinder of issue. Moreover, the Court specifically rejected the contention that obscene material was contraband along
with narcotics and gambling paraphernalia.41
Apparently, therefore, the Court is willing to uphold a temporary
injunction against the person prior to a judicial determination of
38. FLA. STAT. §847.011(6) (1963) has the same requirement. Apparently there
is a distinction between "obscene" and "lawful" so that in order to recover confiscated materials a claimant must prove they were used in a "lawful manner,"
even after the materials have been judicially determined not to be "obscene."
39. 367 U.S. 717 (1961).
40. 378 U.S. 205 (1964).
41. Id. at 211-12.
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obscenity, such as that upheld in Kingsley Books, but is unwilling
to allow any confiscation of allegedly obscene materials, even though
a prompt trial on the merits is assured. This is evidenced by the
Court's statement in A Quantity of Books that "if seizure of books
precedes an adversary determination of their obscenity, there is danger
of abridgment of the right of the public in a free society to unobstructed circulation of non-obscene books." 42 This distinction may be
based upon the belief that the fourth amendment's protection against
unreasonable search and seizure justifies the added protection.- Or
the Court may reason that the actual physical seizure of allegedly
obscene material may unduly influence the issue of obscenity at trial."4
Whatever the reason, it is clear that the Court has drawn this distinction, and that Florida's procedure cannot survive under it.
It is submitted, therefore, that the following changes should be
made.
Section 847.011 (6). This subsection now provides for the pre-trial
seizure and post-trial destruction of obscene material. It should be
totally deleted and replaced by a procedure requiring: (1) that the
prosecuting officer shall specify the allegedly obscene materials in
his complaint asking for an injunction or temporary restraining order,
(2) that any order restraining a person from distributing obscene material before trial shall specify the restricted material, and (3) that
any final injunction ordering the confiscation and destruction of materials adjudged to be obscene shall specify the materials to be destroyed. Although it may well be the current practice of most prosecutors and judges, chapter 847 does not require any such specification
in the complaint, restraining order, or final injunction. This amendment, therefore, would not only eliminate the invalid pre-trial confiscation, but would also lessen the chance that the act might be held
unconstitutional as applied. In other words, there would be less likelihood that a judge might issue a restraining order to prevent a person
from distributing any "obscene" materials without limiting the order
to specific materials, or that he might enter a final order for the
sheriff to seize and destroy all "obscene" materials belonging to the
defendant, thereby allowing the possible destruction of materials
other than those adjudged to be obscene. Neither of these practices
is compatible with current case law and should be disallowed by
statute.
Section 847.02. This section provides for the pre-trial confiscation
of obscene materials in conjunction with an arrest for violation of
42.

Id. at 213.

43. See Marcus v. Search Warrant of Property, 367 U.S. 717, 724-25 (1961).
44. See A Quantity of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205, 211 (1964).
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the act and should be deleted in its entirety. It can only serve to
lead law enforcement officers to believe they have such confiscatory
powers when, in fact, they do not.
Section 933.02 (2) (c). This subsection provides that the use of
obscene materials in violation of chapter 847 shall be a ground for
the issuance of a search warrant. It should be deleted.
Section 933.03. This provides that any obscene materials confiscated by an officer in executing a search warrant shall be held until
after the trial to be disposed of by court order. Because search warrants for obscene materials are invalid, this section should also be
deleted.
Section 933.14. This section provides for the return of property
taken incident to an "unreasonable" search; but obscene materials and
other enumerated items of "contraband" are excepted. As the Supreme Court held in A Quantity of Books, obscene material cannot
be classed as contraband; 45 therefore, obscene materials should be
deleted from the items specified as contraband under this section.
CONCLUSION

The recommendations in this note are made in light of the current
case law. This is not to say, of course, that the law will not change,
or that new requirements will not be added. Obscenity regulation
is an area in which few precise standards have been fixed. And the
standards which can be deciphered are qualified and redefined with
each new case, and the cases are frequent. The recommended amendments, therefore, can promise no more than to conform Florida's
obscenity statutes to the law as of this date. To keep the necessarily
detailed statutes in line with developing standards will require a
continuing study of the cases and periodic revisions.
This note should not be read as an approval of the United States
Supreme Court's strict requirements concerning obscenity control.
Nor should it be read as criticism of the Florida Legislature. In fact,
Florida has done far better than most states in amending its obscenity statutes to conform to Supreme Court requirements. This is
further evidence that the legislature sees great potential harm in the
uncontrolled distribution of obscene materials. But if the state is to
have a valid, enforceable means of regulating obscenity, some amendments must be made. It is hoped that this note might be beneficial
in drafting the needed changes.
GENE
45.

D.

BROWN

Id. at 211-12.
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